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COMMENT
U.S. WETLANDS POLICY, LEGISLA-
TION, AND CASE LAW AS APPLIED TO
THE WISE USE CONCEPT OF THE
RAMSAR CONVENTION
INTRODUCTION
Wetlands provide several important ecological and environ-
mental functions, including habitat and nutrients for many animal and
plant species, natural resources such as fish, shellfish, and timber,
protection against flooding and erosion, and a natural water purifica-
tion system. In addition, wetlands provide recreational, educational,
and research opportunities, and a tremendous source of genetic diver-
sity.' The international community has recognized the important eco-
logical and environmental role of wetlands by implementing the Con-
vention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially As Wa-
terfowl Habitat of 1971, commonly known as the Ramsar Conven-
tion.2 The U.S. became a contracting party to the Ramsar Convention
in 1986?
Significantly, over fifty percent of the 221 million acres of wet-
lands in the lower forty-eight states of the U.S. has been lost over the
last 200 years.4 Only since the 1970s have U.S. policymakers come
1 See Alexandre S. Timoshenko, Protection of Wetlands by International Lmv, 5 PACE
L. REV. 463 (1988) (explaining that wetlands regulate the hydraulic cycle, provide genetic di-
versity and are a habitat for indigenous and migratory birds). See also Michael G. Le Desma, A
Sound of Thunder: Problems and Prospects in Wetland Mitigation Banking, 19 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 497, 497-98 (1994) (describing the "functional value" of wetlands as including: (1)
conveyance and storage of floodwater; (2) prevention of erosion and saltwater intrusion; (3)
sediment control; (4) habitat for fish, shellfish, waterfowl, and other wildlife; (5) habitat for
endangered species; (6) recreation; (7) water supply and water quality maintenance; (8) food
production; (9) timber production; (10) archeological research; (11) educational and research
value; and (12) open space and aesthetic value).
2 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl Habi-
tat, Feb. 2, 1971, 11 I.L.M. 963 [hereinafter Ramsar Convention].
3 id.
4 See WHITE HOUSE OFF. ON ENVTL. POL'Y, PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: A
FAIR, FLEXIBLE, AND EFFECTIVE APPROACH (1993), LEXIS, U.S. News File [hereinafter PRO-
TECT1NG AMERICA'S WETLANDS]. See also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No.
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CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
to realize the important role wetlands play in our environment.
However, since 1972 the U.S. has made significant strides in protect-
ing wetlands, primarily through section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
This Comment demonstrates that current U.S. wetlands management
practices substantially satisfy the "wise use" requirement of the Ram-
sar Convention and can serve as a potential model for other countries.
Part I outlines the Ramsar Convention and the wise use concept;
Part II reviews U.S. wetlands policy, legislation, and case law; Part III
examines mitigation banking and in-lieu-fee arrangements for com-
pensatory mitigation; Part IV analyzes the consistency of the U.S.
wetlands policy, legislation and case law with the wise use concept;
and Part V makes recommendations for improving this consistency.
I. THE RAMSAR CONVENTION AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE WISE USE
CONCEPT
The Ramsar Convention creates an international framework for
protecting wetlands. According to the Preamble, the Contracting Par-
ties recognize "the interdependence of man and his environment,"
that wetlands are a significant "economic, cultural, scientific and rec-
reational" resource and, as a result, there is a desire "to stem the pro-
gressive encroachment on and loss of wetlands now and in the fu-
ture."'6 The treaty, negotiated in Ramsar, Iran, was signed in 1971 in
response to apprehension regarding the declining migratory waterfowl
populations and their wetlands habitat in the 1960s.7 The treaty en-
tered into force in 1975.8 Interestingly, the initiative behind the de-
velopment of the Ramsar Convention was the result of efforts of non-
governmental organizations. 9
First, the convention provides a broad definition of wetlands.10
Article 1(1) defines wetlands as "areas of marsh, fen, peatland or wa-
ter, whether natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, with water
GAO/RCED-98-150, REPORT TO CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON VA, HUD, AND INDEPEND-
ENT AGENCIES, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, U.S. SENATE (1998), LEXIS, U.S. News File
[hereinafter GAO REPORT] (asserting that Fish and Wildlife Service estimates show more than
half of the wetlands acreage present during colonial times have been destroyed due to a lack of
understanding about the important functions wetlands provide).
5 See Le Desma, supra note 1, at 497 (noting that until the mid-1970s both government
and the public viewed wetlands as a nuisance to be drained and filled for development).
6 Ramsar Convention, supra note 2, at 963.
7 See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
1058 (1998).
8 Id.
9 See id. (asserting that the efforts of a non-governmental organization, Wetlands Inter-
national, to convene international meetings on the loss of migratory waterfowl and their habitats
were the driving force behind the adoption the Ramsar Convention).
"0 See id. (explaining that the Ramsar Convention's expansive definition of wetlands
includes several types of "wetlands" not typically considered to be wetlands).
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that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including areas of ma-
fine water the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six me-
tres."" Secondly, Article 2 requires Contracting Parties to list at least
one wetland of international importance located within their terri-
tory.12  Listing enhances a wetland's protected status and ensures
commitment to its protection.13  Finally, Article 3(1) requires that
Contracting Parties "shall formulate and implement their planning so
as to promote the conservation of the wetlands included in the List,
and as far as possible the wise use of wetlands in their territory."'14
This obligation is often overlooked. The wise use requirement ap-
plies to all wetlands located in a Contracting Party's borders, includ-
ing listed and non-listed wetlands. While the treaty did not define
wise use,' 5 subsequent efforts have resulted in an evolving process to
characterize its meaning.
In 1987, at the Third Meeting of the Conference of Contracting
Parties, a Working Group on Criteria and Wise Use was established.
At this meeting, the Conference of the parties adopted the following
formal definition of the wise use of wetlands: "The wise use of wet-
lands is their sustainable utilization for the benefit of humankind in a
way compatible with the maintenance of the natural properties of the
ecosystem."' 6 Sustainable utilization is "human use of a wetland so
that it may yield the greatest continuous benefit to present generations
while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of
future generations. 17 In addition, the Working Group was charged
with developing guidance on the implementation of wise use under
Article 3(1).8
As a result of the Working Group's efforts, Guidelines for the
Implementation of the Wise Use Concept were adopted at the Fourth
Meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties that took place
11 See Ramsar Convention, supra note 2, at 963.
12 Id.
13 See HUNTER Er AL., supra note 7, at 1059-60.
14 See Ramsar Convention, supra note 2, at 964.
15 See Tinoshenko, supra note 1, at 467 (explaining that the meaning of wise use as set
forth in Article 3(1) was legally and scientifically unclear). See also THE RAMSAR CONVEN-
TION ON WETLANDs: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WISE USE
CONCEPT (1993) [hereinafter ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE] (originally adopted as an annex to Reso-
lution 5.6 of the 5th Meeting of the Conference of Contracting Parties in Kushiro, Japan, 1993)
(asserting that in the early years of the treaty, the Wise Use Concept was difficult to employ),
available at http://www.ramsar.orgtkey-add-guide.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2001).
16 RECOMMENDATIONS OF TiE REGINA, CANADA CONFERENCE: RECOMMENDATION 3.3
ON WISE USE OF WETLANDS (1987), available at http://www.ramsar.org/key._re_3.3.htm (last
visited Jan. 6, 2002).
17 Ld.
18 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REGINA, CANADA CONFERENCE: RECOMMENDATION 3.1
ON THE CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING WETLANDS OF INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE (1987), avail-
able at http://www.ramsar.org/key-ree_3.1.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2002).
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in Montreux, Switzerland. 19 The guidelines assert that implementa-
tion of the wise use concept requires the establishment of national
wetlands policies, along with the wise use of individual wetlands.
20
Essential elements of effective national wetlands policies were found
to include:
1. Developing and improving institutional and organiza-
tional arrangements to (a) identify how wetlands conser-
vation and protection can be accomplished as part of the
overall environmental planning process, and (b) establish
mechanisms for planning and implementing wetlands
projects that ensure sustainability;
2. Developing and improving national legislation and gov-
ernment policies and applying existing authority to con-
serve wetlands;
3. Developing and improving the understanding of wetlands
values of both decision-makers and the public at large in
order to foster the implementation of the wise use con-
cept; and
4. Proper planning at specific wetlands sites including
among other components (a) integration of environmental
concerns, particularly wetlands conservation, before ap-
proval of a project; (b) regulation to guard against over-
use of wetlands; (c) establishing and implementing peri-
odic revisions of management plans that embrace the per-
spectives and concerns of local residents.2'
At the 5th Conference of the Contracting Parties in Kushiro, Ja-
pan, the Working Group on Criteria and Wise Use published addi-
tional guidelines in 1993.2 As part of these expanded guidelines, the
19 THE RAMSAR CONVENTION ON WETLANDS: GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE WISE USE CONCEPT (1990) [hereinafter WISE USE GUIDELINES] (originally adopted as
an annex to Recommendation 4.1 at the 4th Meeting of the Conference of Contracting Parties in
Montreux, Switzerland, 1990), available at http://www.ramsar.org/key-wiseuse.htm (last modi-
fied May 10, 2001).
20 1& See also GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL WETLAND
POLICIES (1999) [hereinafter NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICIES] (adopted as Resolution 7.6 of the
7th Meeting of the Conference of Contracting Parties in San Jose, Costa Rica, 1999) (describing
a national wetland policy as a key component for implementing the wise use concept), available
at http://www.ramsar.org/key-guide-nwpe.htm (Feb. 15, 2001).
I WISE USE GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at 1-3.
22 See ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 1.
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Working Group identified several impediments to the implementation
of a national wetlands policy and recommended means to overcome
them. Obstacles included:
* the absence of institutional frameworks at the national,
regional, and local levels, and policies that discouraged
the wise use of wetlands;
* inadequate research and lack of international cooperation,
particularly between neighboring countries for common
or shared wetlands.23
The 1993 expanded guidelines advocated for the development of
the appropriate institutional infrastructure, and increased involvement
of non-government organizations as part of the process of developing
a national wetlands policy.24 Further, the guidelines recommended
conducting environmental impact assessments to ascertain whether
projects that affect wetlands are compatible with wise use.2 More-
over, the guidelines recommended establishing a permit system for
actions that affect wetlands. In order to accomplish these goals, the
1993 guidance made clear that knowledge of wetlands and their func-
tions is needed.26 The necessary steps to acquire the requisite knowl-
edge include the development of a wetlands inventory, research,
monitoring, and training.2 7 The guidance described wetlands inven-
tory development as an evolving long-term process.2 Research
should include a diverse array of efforts to expand knowledge regard-
ing wetlands.29 Training of policy-makers and field staff is critical to
successfully achieving wise use.30 Finally, the 1993 guidance empha-
sized the need to educate the public at large regarding wetlands val-
23d.
2s l at 4.
2 Id. at6.
27 Id.
m Id. at 6-7 (describing a wetlands inventory as a long-term, multi-disciplinary data
collection effort to identify wetlands, their uses, potential and existing problems, and areas of
needed research).
29 Id. at 7-8 (indicating that research involves quantification of wetlands ecological,
social and economic values and functions, identification of sustainable wetlands uses and prac-
tices, and development of wetlands restoration methods). See also NATIONAL WETLANDS POLl-
CIS, supra note 20, at 6 (indicating a current lack of quantified data on wetlands benefits).
30 See ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 8-9 (describing needed training to
include courses on (I) planning, (2) actual wetlands management; and (3) advocacy and en-
forcement of the wise use concept).
2001]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW
ues.
31 The guidance goes so far as to assert that most people do not
even know what a wetland is. 32 Development of a national wetlands
policy represents an important step in implementing wise use under
the Ramsar Convention.33
The 1993 guidelines recommended improved management at
specific sites consistent with the wise use concept. In order to ac-
complish wise use, specific wetlands site management must balance
all uses, including human activities, and must consider local circum-
stances and existing uses. The 1993 guidance specifies that a well-
designed management plan is comprised of a description of the site,
an understanding of past environmental impacts to wetlands, and a
definition of both the short- and long-term goals of managing the site
and implementation. 34
II. NATIONAL U.S. WETLANDS POLICY, LEGISLATION, AND CASE
LAW
This section outlines the current state of U.S. wetlands manage-
ment in light of the Ramsar Convention and the wise use concept.
U.S. wetlands management is comprised of three elements: policy and
associated infrastructure, legislation, and case law. Understanding
the evolution of relevant case law is critical to assessing whether U.S.
wetlands policy conforms to the Ramsar Convention's wise use re-
quirement. The judiciary's evolving interpretation of wetlands legis-
lation plays an important role in determining the scope of governmen-
tal authority in preserving wetland values.
A. Policy and Infrastructure
Thirty-six federal agencies conducted wetlands related activities
during fiscal years 1990-97. 35 Moreover, in constant 1997 dollars,
total funding for these activities increased from $508 million in fiscal
year 1990 to $787 million in fiscal year 1997.36 This represents ap-
proximately a fifty-five percent increase in funding.37 The primary
federal agencies responsible for wetlands management and oversight
are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps"), the Department
31 Id. at 9-10 (outlining the three steps of an effective public education program as: (1)
defining the audience; (2) research to identify the most appropriate educational approach for the
target audience; and (3) the actual education campaign).
32 Id. at9.
33 See NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICIES, supra note 20, at 14-15 (explaining that the
development of a national wetlands policy is key to implementing the wise use concept).34 Id. at 10-11.
35 See also GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
36 id.
37 id.
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of Agriculture's Farm Service Agency and Natural Resources Con-
servation Service, the Department of Interior's Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice, the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration, and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA").38 These six agencies represent seventy percent of
the funding and sixty-five percent of the personnel dedicated to wet-
lands management and programs.39
In 1989, President Bush announced a no net loss of wetlands pol-
icy, the first explicit national goal of U.S. wetlands policy.4° In 1993,
President Clinton followed suit in seeking to protect the nation's wet-
lands by announcing five guiding principles to wetlands policy.
These five principles were:
1. A short-term goal of no net loss of wetlands followed by a
long-term goal of increasing both the quality and quantity of U.S.
wetlands;
2. Create efficient, fair, flexible, and predictable wetlands
regulatory programs that minimize the impact on private property, but
also afford ample wetlands protection;
3. Encourage the use of non-regulatory programs, advance
planning, restoration, inventory development and research, and pub-
lic/private cooperation to accomplish long-term wetlands manage-
ment goals;
4. Expand federal cooperation with state, local, and tribal gov-
ernments, the private sector, and individual citizens to protect wet-
lands; and
5. Base federal wetlands policy on the best scientific informa-
tion available.4 '
The Clinton Administration sought to achieve these five princi-
ples through several policy mechanisms including:
38 id.
39 Id.
40 1l at 3 (noting that even though several statutes protecting wetlands had been enacted,
and two executive orders established, prior to President Bush's no net loss policy the U.S. had
never had a specific and consistent wetlands policy).
"' See PROTEMrING AMERICA'S WETLANDS, supra note 4, at 3.
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1. Promotion of wetlands restoration through voluntary, non-
regulatory programs.
2. Encouragement of the use of advanced comprehensive
planning that includes wetlands identification, mapping, and assess-
ment of wetlands functions in order to distinguish between wetlands
that are sensitive requiring significant protection and those that may
be used for development.
3. Use of mitigation banks, which can be identified through
advanced planning.
4. Emphasis on advanced planning at the local/watershed level
since there is no scientific basis for a nationwide ranking system for
wetlands types and functions.
5. A greater role for state, local, and tribal governments. 42
The Clinton wetlands policy emphasized the important role for
mitigation banking43 as part of its national wetlands policy. Mitiga-
tion banking is defined as: "restoration, creation, enhancement, and in
exceptional circumstances, preservation undertaken expressly for the
purpose of compensating for unavoidable wetland losses in advance
of development actions, when such compensation cannot be achieved
at the development site or would not be as environmentally benefi-
cial."44 Thus, both the Bush and Clinton administrations took an ac-
tive approach to conceptualizing and articulating a national wetlands
policy.
B. Legislation
A number of statutes govern federal wetlands management.
These statutes include the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
("Clean Water Act"), 45 the Water Resources Development Acts of
42 Id. at3-12.
43 Id. at 8 (asserting that Congress should endorse the use of mitigation banking as an
appropriate option, and provide statutory authority for states to use the Revolving Fund to capi-
talize mitigation banks since seventy-five percent of remaining wetlands in the lower forty-eight
states are on private property).
4 Department of Defense, Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of
Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605, 58606 (Nov. 28, 1995) [hereinafter Department of De-
fense].
4 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
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1990,46 1992,47 and 1996,48 and the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 ("NEPA").49 Of all of these statues, section 404 of the
Clean Water Act provides the primary means of managing wetlands
and regulating their use.50 Under section 404, the Secretary of the
Army, acting through the Corps, is authorized to issue permits for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters of the
United States.
Section 404(a)(1) authorizes the Corps to issue permits "for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters" after
notice and opportunity for public comment.5' Section 502(7) defines
navigable waters as any "navigable water of the United States, ' 52 and,
as discussed below, the judiciary's changing interpretation of this
term plays a large role in defiming federal authority to regulate wet-
lands. Section 404(b)(1) provides the substantive framework that the
Corps uses to determine if a permit is to be issued. Under section
404(b)(1), the Corps determines if a permit is to be granted based on
the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites
for Dredged or Fill MaterialP3 promulgated by the EPA. In order to
protect wetlands, these Guidelines require the Corps to first determine
that there is no practicable alternative. As stated in the Guidelines:
"no discharge... shall be permitted if there is a practicable alterna-
tive to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact
on the aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have
other significant adverse environmental consequences." 54
46 33 U.S.C. § 2317 (1994) (codifying the no net loss of wetlands policy announced by
the Bush Administration and requiring the Corps, EPA, and the Fish and Wildlife Service to
design a strategy for achieving this goal).
4' 33 U.S.C. § 2326 (1994) (authorizing the Corps to carry out wetlands protection, res-
toration, and creation projects).
4' 33 U.S.C. § 2330 (1994) (authorizing the Corps to conduct aquatic ecosystem projects
to enhance environmental quality).
49 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994) (requiring the preparation of environmental impact assess-
ments for major federal actions including permitting of the dredging and filling of wetlands that
must address the environmental impacts and potential alternatives of the proposed action).
so See Jonathan Silverstein, Comment, Taking Wetlands to the Bank: The Role of Wet-
land Mitigation Banking in a Comprehensive Approach to Wetlands Protection, 22 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 129, 132 (1994) (describing section 404 as the primary means of U.S. wetlands
regulation). See also Matthew M. D'Amico, Be All that You Can Be, But Nothing More: Na-
tional Mining Association v. United States Army Corp of Engineers and the Corps' Critical Loss
of Wetlands Control, 17 PAcE ENvTL. L. REV. 325, 330 (2000) (explaining that section 404 is
the central source of federal authority to regulate wetlands because it gives the Corps the ability
to regulate the "discharge of dredge or fill material").
5' 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
52 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
53 40 C.F.R. pt. 230 (2000).
54 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2000).
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Practicable alternatives are presumed to exist for non-water de-
pendent projects.55 A practicable alternative is an alternative that ful-
fills the basic project purpose, is available, and can be done taking
into account cost, technology and logistics. 56 The basic project pur-
pose can have a significant impact on whether a practicable alterna-
tive may be found.57 Moreover, the Guidelines bar permits that will
result in the significant degradation of an aquatic resource.58
There are a number of safeguards that apply to the Corps'
evaluation of a permit which are delineated into internal and external
safeguards.5 9  According to the Corps, the most important internal
safeguard is the public interest review, which requires a "careful con-
sideration of all public interest factors relevant to each particular
case."6 The external safeguards include the EPA's statutory "veto"
power over the Corps' decision to issue a permit.6' Moreover, the
EPA, the Department of Commerce and Department of Interior may
request a high level review before a permit is issued if there is insuffi-
cient coordination at the Corps' district level, if important new infor-
mation relevant to the project and permit application develops, or if
the project raises nationally significant issues.6 Finally, citizens may
sue the Corps to enjoin their decision to issue a permit.63
Beyond "practicable alternative" and these significant safe-
guards, the Corps applies a three-step sequence in evaluating a permit
application under section 404 of the Clean Water Act. These steps
are: (1) determining that potential adverse impacts have been avoided
55 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) (2000). However, this is a rebuttable presumption. See
James City County v. EPA, 955 F.2d 254, 260 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding a lack of substantial
evidence for EPA's determination that there were practicable alternatives to the building of a
dam); Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming summary
judgment for Corps-approved golf-course, even if Corps limited its evaluation of practicable
alternatives and concluded none existed).
56 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.3(q) and 230.10(a)(2) (2000).
57 See Kim Diana Connolly, THE CORPS REGULATORY PROGRAM: SECTION 404 PER-
MITS AND SECTION 10 PERMITS 27 (February 6, 2001) (draft copy on file with author) (asserting
that the more narrowly a basic purpose is defined the less likely it is that a practicable alterna-
tive will be identified).
58 Id. at 26.
59 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, REGULATORY PROGRAM OVERVIEW 7, at
http://www.usace.army.millinetlfunctions/Cw/cecwolregloceover.htm (last visited Nov. 21,
2001) [hereinafter REGULATORY PROGRAM OVERVIEW].
60 Id. See also Connolly, supra note 57, at 43 (listing the factors considered as part of
the pubic interest review as conservation, economics, general environmental issues, potential
flooding, soil protection and erosion, water quality and overall welfare of the public).
6' 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1994). See also REGULATORY PROGRAM OVERVIEW, supra note
59, at 7 (describing the EPA's veto power as being the ability to prohibit a permit from being
issued if the EPA's Administrator believes the discharge of dredged or fill materials will have
an unacceptable impact on the relevant wetland(s)).
62 See REGULATORY PROGRAM OVERVIEW, supra note 59, at 7-8.
63 Id. at 8.
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to the maximum extent practicable; (2) minimizing unavoidable im-
pacts; and (3) providing compensatory mitigation for any remaining
adverse impacts.64 In fact, Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines for Specifi-
cation of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material requires "ap-
propriate and practicable" compensatory mitigation.65 Compensatory
mitigation includes the restoration of degraded wetlands or man made
creation of new ones. 66
Finally, public involvement, though not listed specifically as a
safeguard by the Corps, represents a significant safeguard in protect-
ing wetlands. 67 First, at least for controversial projects, the Corps
uses public notice and public hearings to solicit comments from the
public in evaluating a project for which a permit application has been
submitted. Second, and perhaps more important, is public participa-
tion through the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") as required under NEPA6 for major federal actions. 69 In pre-
paring an EIS, the federal agency must provide a detailed statement of
the potential environmental impacts of, along with alternatives to, a
proposed action.70  As the Corps describes the process, the public is
involved through almost every step of an EIS.7'
C. Case Law
The judiciary's interpretation of wetlands management legisla-
tion is critical in defining the authority of the Corps and other federal
agencies to regulate wetlands. One issue that has been a source of
evolving legal doctrine is the courts' interpretation of the definition of
"navigable waters" under section 404(a)(1). As the case law demon-
strates, the initial interpretation of "navigable waters" was expansive,
providing the Corps with broad regulatory authority. However, as the
definition has evolved and narrowed their regulatory authority has
diminished. The same pattern has emerged regarding discharges that
the Corps may regulate.
6 See Memorandum of Agreement between the Environmental Protection Agency and
the Department of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation under the Clean Water
Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (1990) [hereinafter MOA].
6 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d) (2000).
6 See MOA, supra note 64, at 9212.
67 See REGULATORY PROGRAM OVERVIEW, supra note 59, at 4-5.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(c) (1994).
69 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b) (2000) (describing approval of project permits as a major
federal action requiring the preparation of an EIS).
70 id.
71 See REGULATORY PROGRAM OVERVIEW, supra note 59, at 4-5 (outlining the public's
involvement in an EIS as actual face to face input during the seoping process, and providing
comments on the draft EIS that includes comments not only on the EIS, but on the proposed
project itself).
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Generally, wetlands are not lakes, rivers, and streams or that
which we normally conceptualize as navigable waters. Earlier in the
history of the Clean Water Act, the judiciary had a broad interpreta-
tion of navigable waters, thereby expanding the federal government's
authority to regulate the exploitation, degradation and destruction of
wetlands. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,72 the Court
addressed this issue. The Corps sought to prohibit Riverside Bay-
view, without a permit, from filling in wetlands "near," and thus adja-
cent to a lake, in preparation for a housing development. The Corps
asserted its jurisdiction under the regulation that defined wetlands as:
"areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal
circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally in-
clude swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas. 73
The Court approved the Corps' interpretation of the statute. In so
doing, the Court found that the actual statutory language, legislative
history, and underlying policies of the Clean Water Act justified such
an interpretation. 74 Specifically, the Court found that the broad defi-
nition navigable waters contained in section 502(7), "waters of the
United States," demonstrated that Congress intended to include its
Commerce Clause authority to regulate "at least some waters that
would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding of
that term."75 However, the Court specifically noted that its decision
in Riverside Bayview did not address wetlands that were not necessar-
76ily adjacent to navigable waters,7 an issue that the Court has recently
addressed in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers.77
Indeed, the Solid Waste Court made specific note of the Court's
reservation in Riverside Bayview. 78 In contrast to the wetlands in Riv-
erside Bayview, the wetlands in Solid Waste were not adjacent to
navigable waters. In Solid Waste, the Court held that section 404
72 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
73 Id. at 123-24 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (c) (1978)).
74 Id. at 131-39. See also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp 685, 686
(D.D.C. 1975) (holding that by defining navigable waters within the Clean Water Act as "waters
of the United States," Congress demonstrated its intent to assert federal authority "over the
nation's waters to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitu-
tion").
75 See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133.
76 See id. at 124 n.2 & 131-32 n.8 (noting that the Corps' regulations covering wetlands
not adjacent to other waters were not an issue in the case).77 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
78 See id. at 167 (explaining that the holding in Riverside Bayview was due to the "sig-
nificant nexus between the wetlands and the 'navigable waters').
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powers to regulate the discharge of dredged or fill material do not
extend to isolated intrastate wetlands. 79 The Court's decision was
based on its finding that Congress did not intend that the definition of
navigable waters apply to such wetlands. 80 However, the Court did
suggest that if it were to address the constitutional issue, it would find
that the regulation of isolated intrastate wetlands exceeded the limits
of power conferred under the Commerce Clause.81
The courts' definition of what constitutes a discharge for pur-
poses of section 404 of the Clean Water Act demonstrates a similar
pattern of shrinking federal regulatory authority over wetlands. In
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh82 the court held that dis-
charge included re-deposits of materials that had been removed from
wetlands.83 The landowners in Avoyelles used large mechanized
equipment, including bulldozers and tractors, to clear trees and other
vegetation that resulted in the re-deposit of some of the materials as
part of the clearing process. 84 Likewise, in Rybachek v. EPA85 the
court ruled that re-depositing waste materials back into a waterway
after separating out the desired materials is also a discharge that the
federal government may regulate. 86 In Rybacheck, the re-deposited
material was found to have adverse impacts on aesthetics and water-
quality since the material was composed of toxic metals. 87 However,
in National Mining Association v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,88
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that de mini-
mis falback as part of normal dredging operations does not constitute
a discharge subject to section 404 regulation. 89  The court distin-
79 Id. See also U.S. ENViRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM ON SUPREME COURT RULING CONCERNING
CWA JURISDICTION OVER ISOLATED WATERS (Jan. 19, 2001), available at
http:l/www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands (explaining that the Court's holding effectively prohibits
imposing regulations under the Clean Water Act on "intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation, or destruction of which could affect inter-
state or foreign commerce"5.
"o See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 167-68 (stating that neither the language of the Clean
Water Act, nor legislative history demonstrated sufficient Congressional intent to extend section
404 authority to isolated intrastate wetlands).
81 See id. at 172-74 (asserting that there are significant constitutional questions raised
regarding the validity of imposing federal regulations on the wetlands at issue). See also United
States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251,257-58 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Corps may not regulate
intrastate wetlands that could affect interstate commerce under the Clean Water Act).
s2 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
" See id. at 923.
8 See id. at 920-23.
85 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990).
86 See id. at 1285-86.
87 See i. at 1282.
88 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
'9 See id. at 1404.
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guished the incidental fallback in National Mining from the large-
scale re-deposits in Avoyelles. 90 By limiting the Corps' authority, this
decision could become a considerable impediment to wetlands protec-
tion and management. 91
III. COMPENSATORY MITIGATION: THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF
MITIGATION BANKS AND IN-LIEu-FEEs
Compensatory mitigation represents a sound alternative when
wetland impacts are unavoidable and is the most recent dynamic in-
teraction between federal government policy and its statutory author-
ity under section 404. The role of compensatory mitigation continues
to grow as government regulatory authorities and developers attempt
to strike a balance between further growth and preservation of wet-
lands values and functions. Therefore, compensatory mitigation, at
least conceptually, is fully consistent with wise use under the Ramsar
Convention that also seeks to balance the competing needs of devel-
opment and sustainability. Currently, the Wise Use Guidance implic-
itly recognizes the possible role of compensatory mitigation, and it
should explicitly due so in the future.
92
In 1990, the Corps and the EPA entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement ("MOA") clarifying the sequencing scheme of avoiding
wetlands impacts, mitigating those that must occur, and then requiring
compensatory mitigation for those that are unavoidable.93 Specifi-
cally, when unavoidable wetlands impacts occur, compensatory miti-
gation should be required based on the following criteria:
1. On-site compensatory mitigation is preferred over off-site
mitigation;
2. If off-site compensatory mitigation is not practical, the
mitigation should take place within the geographic region/watershed;
3. In-kind (i.e. wetlands of the same type) compensatory miti-
gation is preferred over out-of-kind mitigation; and
90 Id. at 1406. See also D'Amico, supra note 50, at 346 (noting this distinction between
National Mining and Avoyelles).
91 See D'Amico, supra note 50, at 327 (describing National Mining as a potentially sig-
nificant limitation on the ability to protect wetlands through stricter regulation).
92 See also WISE USE GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at 3 (listing restoration of wetlands at
particular sites that have been degraded as means to address wetlands problems at specific sites).
93 See Silverstein, supra note 50, at 132 (explaining that the purpose of the MOA was to
clarify the Corps' process in issuing section 404 permits).
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4. Wetlands restoration is preferred over man-made wetlands
due to a greater likelihood of success.94
Given that the objective of compensatory mitigation is to coun-
teract environmental losses, the MOA provides significant flexibility
to the Corps in establishing the minimum mitigation requirement for
wetlands that are adversely affected due to issuance of a section 404
permit. The default ratio is 1:1. However, the Corps states "where
functional values of the area being impacted are demonstrably high
and the replacement wetlands are of lower functional value or the
likelihood of success of the mitigation project is low" the mitigation
requirement may be higher.95 Two means of providing compensatory
mitigation that have received increasing attention are mitigation
banks and in-lieu-fee arrangements.
Consistent with the Clinton Administration policy discussed ear-
lier, the MOA also recognized that mitigation banking might be an
appropriate means of compensatory mitigation. 6 However, the MOA
provided little specific guidance on mitigation banking. In 1995, the
Corps, the EPA, and the Departments of Agriculture, Interior and
Commerce issued the Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use
and Operation of Mitigation Banks.97 In fact, in what seems to repre-
sent a change in policy since the MOA in 1990, the mitigation bank
guidance "relies on the use of compensatory mitigation to offset un-
avoidable damage to wetlands. 98 Mitigation banking is defined as
the "restoration, creation, enhancement and, in exceptional circum-
stances, preservation of wetlands and/or other aquatic resources ex-
pressly for the purpose of providing compensatory mitigation in ad-
vance of authorized impacts to similar resources."
99
The goal of mitigation banking is to provide cost-effective and
flexible means of maintaining the ecological functions of a water-
shed.1°° To facilitate their success, the guidance suggests the mitiga-
tion banks should be considered not in isolation, but as part of an
overall watershed plan, and the techniques employed should be care-
fully chosen based on those that have yielded the highest long-term
success rate. 01 To establish a mitigation bank, sponsors must submit
a prospectus that is used to develop a mitigation bank instrument that
94 See MOA, supra note 64, at 9212.
95 See id.
96 See id.
97 See Department of Defense, supra note 44, at 58,605.
98 See kL at 58,606.
99 See i& at 58,607.
'0o See id. at 58,608-58,609.
101 Id.
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documents the objectives and administration including ecological and
financial resources.1°2 Documenting sound financial resources is
critical to assuring long-term management and monitoring of the
banks, and the mitigation bank guidance places the responsibility for
assuring the successful operation of the bank squarely on the bank's
sponsor, and specifically requires that the wetlands be protected in
perpetuity.10 3  Currently, there are approximately 100 mitigation
banks throughout the U.S. across thirty-four states. Moreover, sub-
stantial evidence suggests that the role of mitigation banking can be
expected to grow in the future.105
Interestingly, the mitigation bank guidance promulgated in 1995
defined mitigation banks not to include in-lieu-fee/fee mitigation ar-
rangements and provided only minimal formal direction as to when
such an approach might be used.1°6 In-lieu-fee mitigation requires
funds to be paid to a prescribed entity or organization that will use the
funds to carry out wetlands mitigation efforts or purchase credits from
an existing mitigation bank. In fact, such compensatory mitigation
programs have been implemented in several states across the U.S.1°7
The Corps, EPA, and the Departments of Interior and Commerce
have issued the Federal Guidance on the Use of In-Lieu-Fee Ar-
rangements for Compensatory Mitigation Under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act and Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.' °8
Under the In-Lieu-Fee guidance, where appropriate, an in-lieu-fee
arrangement may be used to provide compensatory mitigation by es-
tablishing an agreement "between the sponsor and the agencies" that
'02 See id. at 58,609 (listing the information contained in a mitigation bank instrument as:
(a) bank goals and objectives; (b) ownership of bank lands; (c) bank size and type of wetlands
and other water-based resources to be included in the bank site; (d) baseline conditions of the
site; (e) geographic service area; (f) types of impacted wetlands for which the mitigation bank
may properly provide compensatory mitigation; (g) methods of determining debits and credits;
(h) accounting procedures; (i) performance standards; (j) reporting procedures; (k) contingency
and remedial plans; (1) financial assurances; (m) compensation ratios; and (n) provisions for
long-term management and maintenance).
,03 See id. at 58,612.
104 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA-240-R-01-001, THE
UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRON-
MENT 107 (2001) [hereinafter EPA].
105 See id. (asserting that wetlands mitigation banking, due to its endorsement by the
Corps, EPA, and by legislators behind the reauthorization of the Clean Water Act, will grow in
importance as a means of protecting the nation's wetlands).
106 See id. at 18.
107 See id. at 54 (noting that Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
Texas, and Virginia have used in-lieu-fee compensation programs).
108 DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FEDERAL GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF IN-LIEU-FEE ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR COMPENSATORY MITIGATION UNDER SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND
SECTION 10 OF THE RIVERS HARBORS ACT 3 (2001) [hereinafter FEDERAL GUIDANCE], avail-
able at http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/iwr/Regulatory/regulintro.htm.
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contains the same information as the instrument needed for the estab-
lishment of a mitigation bank.1 09
In-lieu-fee agreements may be used to compensate for lost wet-
lands for individual site permits as well as general permits.10 For
general permits, in-lieu-fees may be used for fulfilling compensatory
mitigation requirements when on-site mitigation is not possible or less
environmentally beneficial. Further, the In-Lieu-Fee guidance sets
forth several factors to consider in planning and establishing an in-
lieu-fee compensatory mitigation arrangement."'
An example of a well-designed in-lieu-fee compensatory mitiga-
tion program is the Lake Belt Mitigation Plan ("LBMP"). In 1992 the
Florida Legislature created the Lake Belt Committee to design a plan
that "maximizes efficient recovery of limestone while promoting the
social and economic welfare of the community and protecting the en-
vironment."112  In developing the approximately fifty-year LBMP,
federal, state and local government officials developed a detailed
master plan in concert with the Florida rock mining industry. The
LBMP allows the rock mining industry to recover hundreds of thou-
sands of tons of lime rock that lies beneath wetlands in exchange for
an in-lieu-fee to be used to achieve compensatory mitigation through
government acquisition, enhancement and maintenance of wetlands.
The required compensatory mitigation ratio has been determined to be
2.5:1 per acre of wetlands.113 Key components of the in-lieu-fee pro-
gram include the implementation of:
1. a fee per ton on all limestone sold from the Lake Belt area,
including an established formula for the annual adjustment to account
for cost growth in carrying out mitigation activities.
109 See id.
n0 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (1994) (stating the Secretary of the Army may issue general
permits, five years in length, on a state, regional, or nationwide basis for a category of activities
for the discharge of dredged or fill materials into wetlands).
n1 See FEDERAL GUIDANCE, supra note 108, at 4-7 (describing relevant planning factors
to include: (1) ensuring the sponsor is a qualified organization; (2) advanced planning in coop-
eration with the Corps; (3) watershed-based planning; (4) careflul site selection; (5) assurance of
technical feasibility; (6) determining an appropriate role for wetlands preservation; (7) ensuring
that funds are used for wetlands mitigation projects only; and (8) assurance of sufficient funding
for the perpetual monitoring and management of compensatory mitigation sites).
112 See SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY LAKE
BELT PLAN IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE 1999 PROGRESS REPORT 2 (2000) [hereinafter MI-
AMI-DADE REPORT].
113 See SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY LAKE
BELT PLAN PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF MITIGATION SUBCOMMITEE (2001) (asserting that the
mitigation ratio was determined after careful study of the area by the Corps, State Department of
Environmental Protection, SFWMD, Miami-Dade County Department of Environmental Re-
sources and Management and the EPA), at
/www.sfwmd.gov/org/pld/proj/lakebelt/subcommitteef2.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2001).
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2. a report recommending any changes in the fee to ensure that
revenue from the fee covers the actual cost of mitigation activities,
beginning January 31, 2010.114
In exchange for paying the fee, the limestone mining industry re-
ceives a streamlined regulatory permitting process, and greater busi-
ness operating certainty.1 5 Notwithstanding the issuance of the In-
Lieu-Fee guidance, and well-designed projects such as the Lake Belt
Mitigation Plan, there remains a preference for mitigation banks to be
the source of compensatory mitigation.1
16
IV. CONSISTENCY OF U.S. NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY,
LEGISLATION, AND CASE LAW WITH THE WISE USE CONCEPT OF THE
RAMSAR CONVENTION
Analysis of U.S. national wetlands policy, legislation and case
law demonstrates consistency with the Guidelines for the Implemen-
tation of the Wise Use concept of the Ramsar Convention. U.S. pol-
icy, legislation, and case law have created the institutional arrange-
ments, statutory framework, and system for assessing projects on a
site-by-site basis that the Wise Use Guidance suggests is essential to
the successful implementation of the wise use concept. Section 404
of the Clean Water Act complies with the recommendation that a
permitting system be established for actions that affect wetlands. The
NEPA requirement that an EIS be prepared for major federal actions
such as issuing permits is consistent with the Wise Use Guidance's
specification that well designed wetlands management plans include
such an assessment to determine the impact of projects on wetlands.
In the context of a specific wetlands site, the permitting and EIS proc-
esses of section 404 of the Clean Water Act and NEPA are fully con-
sistent with the wise use concept. As discussed in Part II, the Ram-
sar's Wise Use Guidance recognizes that there are competing uses for
wetlands, which if done in a sustainable manner, can be consistent
with wise use. Together, section 404 of the Clean Water Act and
NEPA theoretically satisfy the sustainable use of wetlands resources.
It is important to note that in addition to the Clean Water Act and
NEPA, there are several other statutes that relate to protecting or con-
,14 See MIAMI-DADE REPORT, supra note 112, at 3.
'" See id. at 4.
116 See FEDERAL GUIDANCE, supra note 108, at 4 (explaining that in-lieu-fees are pre-
ferred over mitigation banks when the bank cannot provide in-kind mitigation, or when the only
available bank credits are for preservation rather than wetlands restoration, enhancement or
creation).
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serving wetlands in the U.S.1 17 For example, under section 7(a)(2) of
Endangered Species Act, the Corps must consult with the Fish and
Wildlife Service to ensure that if a wetlands permit is issued it will
not jeopardize endangered or threatened species or their wetlands
habitat.118 A second example is the Swampbuster program contained
in the Food Security Act." 9 Under this program, farmers who plant
crops on converted wetlands are not eligible for U.S. Department of
Agriculture ("USDA") farm program benefits including several forms
of loans and other assistance. Section 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act' 2° requires federal agencies to account for the impact
of their undertakings on historic resources, which may include wet-
lands permits, and provide a justification for proceeding with the un-
dertaking. Finally, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Act, 121 as amended
by the Sustainable Fisheries Act, now includes provisions that pro-
vide an additional safeguard on destruction of wetlands that are essen-
tial fish habitats.'
Moreover, cases such as United States v. Riverside Bayview,123
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. March,124 and Rybachek v. EPA125
have allowed the Corps to extend its wetlands regulatory program to
what seems to be the greatest extent possible under the Clean Water
Act. In addition, as described above, the U.S. has dedicated substan-
tial financial resources and personnel for wetlands protection. Fur-
ther, the U.S. has developed extensive inventories, a critical compo-
nent to enhancing our knowledge of wetlands, and has monitored our
success in preserving wetlands and their ecological functions.'
26
117 See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. The GAO Report explains that there are over
twenty-five federal statutes that have resulted in:
1. regulation of activities undertaken in areas designated as wetlands;
2. acquisition of wetlands through purchase or protective easements that prevent
certain activities, such as draining and filling;
3. restoration of damaged wetlands or the creation of new wetlands; and
4. disincentives to altering wetlands or incentives to protect them in their natural
states. Id
18 16 U.S.C § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
.. 16 U.S.C §§ 3811- 3812 (1994).
,20 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1994).
121 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (1994).
12 See Kristen M. Fletcher & Sharonne E. O'Shea, Essential Fish Habitat: Does Calling
It Essential Make It So?, 30 ENVTL L. 51, 92-97 (2000) (explaining that the "essential fish habi-
tat" language requires federal agencies to consider and consult with the Secretary of Commerce
regarding the impact of their actions on essential habitats).
23 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
124 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
'25 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990).
126 Id at 5 (describing the National Wetlands Inventory maintained by the Fish and Wild-
life Service, and the National Resources Inventory managed by the National Resources Conser-
vation Service).
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Avoiding and minimizing adverse impacts on wetlands from hu-
man activity is clearly consistent with the wise use mandate of Ram-
sar. Moreover, compensatory mitigation, including mitigation banks
and in-lieu-fee arrangements, can play a significant role. Mitigation
banks and in-lieu-fees represent the use of market incentives for pro-
tecting the environment because they are designed to allow develop-
ment while preserving the ecological and environmental functions of
wetlands. 27 The positive aspects of mitigation banks include:
1. Environmental values are better protected in large-scale
mitigation efforts;
2. Large-scale mitigation efforts take advantage of economies
of scale that improves the long-run ability for compensatory mitiga-
tion efforts to succeed; and
3. Developers will know the cost of wetland mitigation in ad-
vance.
Another important factor that favors mitigation banking is the
ability to provide compensatory mitigation in advance of adverse im-
pacts on wetlands.129 Finally, large-scale mitigation efforts allow for
more effective government enforcement and monitoring of compensa-
tory mitigation projects. 130 In-lieu-fee programs can provide many of
the same advantages so long as the fees are channeled to large mitiga-
tion projects. The one advantage that mitigation banks may have over
in-lieu-fee arrangements is that the former provides advanced mitiga-
tion whereas the latter probably will not.
Notwithstanding apparent compliance, there are several short-
comings and limits to U.S. ability to meet the wise use mandate of the
127 See Donald A. Carr & William L. Thomas, Looking for a Way To Reduce Wetland
Permitting Delays and Costs? Put Your Money in a Bank, METROPOLITAN CoRP. COUNS., Apr.
1998, at 8 (describing mitigation banks as a means of compensatory mitigation designed to
offset wetland losses from development that has gained growing acceptance, and actually in-
creases incentives for private owners of wetlands not to develop their property).
,28 See EPA, supra note 104, at 107. See also Silverstein, supra note 50, at 137-39 (out-
lining the benefits of mitigation banking to include advanced mitigation, consolidated large-
scale mitigation projects, and streamlining the permitting process by avoiding having to negoti-
ate several small individual mitigation projects); Department of Defense, supra note 44, 60 Fed.
Reg., at 58,607 (describing the advantages of mitigation banks over individual mitigation pro-
jects as a better ability to maintain the quality of the ecosystem, aggregation of financial and
scientific resources and expertise, and an improved permitting process).
129 See Le Desma, supra note 1, at 503 (outlining EPA and developers' position that using
mitigation banks reduces the temporal loss of wetlands).
,30 See Silverstein, supra note 50, at 137. See also Department of Defense, supra note 44,
at 58,607.
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Ramsar Convention. First, the quality and accuracy of both U.S. in-
ventories is highly questionable. According to the General Account-
ing Office, "officials from the Environmental Protection Agency have
expressed concern about the estimates of both inventories. The issues
raised by officials of the two inventories and EPA include the ade-
quacy of quality control of data and of quality assurance procedures,
the dates of aerial photography used, and the methods used to develop
the estimates."'
3
'
In addition to the inventory problems identified above, the reli-
ability of the data is questionable because of the use of inconsistent
definitions by the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Resources
Conservation Service, the inclusion of non-wetlands acreage data, and
double counting. Data shortcomings make it difficult to assess ac-
complishments in protecting wetlands. Moreover, they make wet-
lands conservation and protection efforts extremely hard to plan.
These effects of poor data are inconsistent with the wise use concept.
Second, as noted earlier, both National Mining and Solid Waste
have curbed the authority of the federal government to protect the
quality of wetlands. Significant environmental harms and loss of wet-
lands could result. As D'Amico states:
Among the harms that could result from the D.C. Circuit's
ruling [in National Mining] are: loss of the bottomland hard-
wood wetlands of the Southeast, which would destroy fish
and wildlife habitats while reducing water quality and in-
creasing flooding; wetlands losses in the prairie potholes of
the upper Midwest, which would threaten waterfowl habitats
and also increase flooding while reducing water quality;
scraping and scouring of riparian areas throughout the West,
destroying the anadramous fish habitat and downstream wa-
ter quality. 132
As a direct reaction to Solid Waste, a shopping center develop-
ment company asserted that it could proceed, without a permit, to fill
in 12.3 acres of intrastate isolated wetlands at a site in Bainbridge
Township, Ohio. Though the developer offered to provide compensa-
tory mitigation, in light of Solid Waste, the developer has emphasized
its ability to fill in the wetlands without a permit or providing mitiga-
131 See also GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.132 D'Amico, supra note 50, at 350.
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tion. 3' At that time, Ohio did not have its own state-permitting
scheme, the state had no regulatory authority independent of that pro-
vided by federal regulatory law. 134 In fact, many states do not have
their own independent permitting program.
Finally, though mitigation banking and in-lieu-fee arrangements
represent an innovative means to fulfill our national policy of "no net
loss" of wetlands and also fulfills the U.S. international wise use obli-
gation, there are several concerns with their effectiveness. 135  Com-
pensatory mitigation may be ineffective "because the science of creat-
ing, enhancing, and restoring wetlands is imprecise and unproved.
1 36
Previous efforts have yielded unsatisfactory success rates.137 Given
the apparent growth in reliance on compensatory mitigation through
banking and in-lieu-fees, failure to achieve constant high success
rates would result in a loss of both wetlands and wetland functions.
Neither outcome is consistent with the wise use obligations under the
Ramsar Convention. Thus, further research and careful planning
must be undertaken to ensure success in the future.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE U.S. COMPLIANCE W1TH THE
RAMSAR CONVENTION'S WISE USE OBLIGATION
The U.S. must take several steps to enhance its compliance with
its obligations as a signatory to the Ramsar Convention. First, the
U.S. must improve the quality of its national wetlands data and de-
velop a single set of data. Only with clear and consistent data can the
U.S. properly assess the state of wetlands and implement appropriate
programs for their protection. The Clinton administration made sig-
nificant efforts to develop accurate data and in May 1998, the Federal
Interagency Wetlands Working Group issued an action plan to pro-
duce a single wetlands status and trends report. 138 To date this has not
been accomplished. However, in developing a plan to address this
data deficiency, budgetary constraints might properly exclude or defer
wetlands not subject to imminent development.
133 See Karen Farkas, Developers Propose Wetlands Deal, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Feb.
13, 2001, atB3.
134 id.
135 See EPA, supra note 104, at 119 (describing another innovative program, the Conser-
vation Resource Program, that pays farmers to place wetlands in the Conservation Reserve
rather than draining and cultivating them).
136 Silverstein, supra note 50, at 133. See also Le Desma, supra note 1, at 502 (explain-
ing that the "functional value [of wetlands] cannot be easily quantified").
137 See Silverstein, supra note 50, at 133 (citing a 1985 study of mitigation projects in
Virginia in which only nine of thirty-two compensatory mitigation sites were found to be fully
successful). See also Le Desma, supra note 1, at 518 (citing a 1990 Florida Department of
Environmental Resources study that less than forty percent of completed compensatory mitiga-
tion projects are successful).
13 See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
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Congress must amend the Clean Water Act to provide federal
regulatory authority over de minimis or incidental fall back. The Na-
tional Mining court's decision turned on its interpretation of Con-
gress's intent.139 In fact, the regulation to strengthen wetlands protec-
tion EPA and Corps promulgated that went into effect on April 17,
2001 excludes incidental fall back as required under National Min-
ing.14° To address this regulatory loophole, Congress can simply
make it clear that its intent is to allow the Corps to regulate de mini-
mis or incidental fallback, especially given the otherwise potential
adverse impacts on wetlands.
The dilemma Solid Waste has created is more difficult to solve.
Though Solid Waste was decided based on statutory interpretation,
the Court strongly suggested that had it decided the case based on
constitutional grounds; federal attempts to regulate isolated intrastate
wetlands would be a violation of the Commerce Clause. To address
this issue, Congress should establish a clear link between isolated in-
trastate wetlands and interstate commerce. Given the court's lan-
guage in Solid Waste, it may be difficult to establish a link that will
withstand judicial scrutiny. This leaves Congress with few alterna-
tives. Congress cannot mandate that states implement regulatory pro-
grams to fill the void in federal authority. In New York v. United
States,'4' the Court held that the federal government violated the
Tenth Amendment in its attempt to coerce state legislatures into its
service or to force states to assume federal responsibilities. Specifi-
cally, the Court found that New York's requirement that either "take
title" to low-level radioactive waste or regulate the waste according to
instructions contained in Congressional legislation was unconstitu-
tional.' 42
However, Congress can provide funding to encourage states to
regulate wetlands, including isolated intrastate wetlands, and enhance
their wetlands management capabilities without violating the Tenth
Amendment. 143 The EPA has an existing funding program, the Wet-
land Development Grants Program, through which Congress can
139 See D'Amico, supra note 50, at 350 (asserting that, given the current language of the
Clean Water Act, the decision in National Mining was correct).
140 See Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, Press Release on the Final "Tul-
loch Rule" Clarification: Enhanced Wetlands Protection (2001), available at
http:/www.epa.gov/owowlwetlands.
141 505 U.S. 144 (1992). See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (ruling
that the federal government cannot commandeer state executive officers into the federal gov-
ernment's service).
142 See New York, 505 U.S. at 173-74.
143 1& (asserting that using monetary incentives to entice states to regulate low level ra-
dioactive waste according to federal desires does not violate state sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
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act.144 Further, at least some of the states have no regulations permit-
ting systems for isolated intrastate wetlands due to a lack of statutory
authority. The Association of State Wetland Managers, Inc. has
drafted a Model State Wetland Protection Act to help states address
this void.145
Alternatively, Congress may exercise its combined power under
Article II, Section 2; Article VI, Section 2; and Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution to require the states to implement regulatory pro-
grams to protect isolated intrastate wetlands. This power is not con-
strained by the Tenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause. 146 The
ability to enact environmental legislation without relying on the
Commerce Clause may be particularly important given the Court's
decisions in United States v. Lopez1 47 and United States v. Morri-
son.1 48 As one commentator has stated:
The Lopez decision signaled a potentially dramatic shift in
the Supreme Court's judicial review of congressional action
under the Commerce Clause ... This recent flurry of Com-
merce Clause challenges, and the success of several of these
challenges in the lower courts, mark a departure from the
previous sixty years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence and
suggest that older statutes such as the [Endangered Species
Act] ... may be vulnerable to a similar attack... Given that
the fundamental purpose of the ESA is to protect endangered
144 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, WETLAND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
GRANTS (explaining that the purpose of the program was to provide state, tribal and local gov-
ernments with fund in order to implement and maintain wetlands management programs), at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands2002grant (last updated Nov. 11, 2001).
145 See MODEL STATE WETLAND STATUTE (Ass'n of State Wetland Managers, Draft
2001) (explaining that the association's model statute is designed "to help states close the gap in
regulations for isolated wetlands created by the U.S. Supreme Court SWANCC decision"), avail-
able at http:/lwww.aswm.orglpolicylmodel-leg.pdf (June 6, 2001).
146 See Matthew Schaefer, Sovereignty Revisited: The "Grey Areas" and "Yellow Zones"
of Split Sovereignty Exposed by Globalization: Choosing Among Strategies of Avoidance, Co-
operation, and Intrusion to Escape an Era of Misguided "New Federalism," 24 CAN.-U.S. L. J.
35, 48 (1998) (explaining that legislation that might otherwise violate of the Tenth Amendment
is constitutional if passed in order to fulfill an obligation under a formally adopted international
treaty). See also Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 390, 392-95 (1998) (noting that conventional wisdom is that the treaty power of the fed-
eral government is not limited by either subject matter or the Tenth Amendment); Gavin R.
Villareal, One Leg to Stand On: The Treaty Power and Congressional Authority for the Endan-
gered Species Act after United States v. Lopez, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1125, 1153-55 (1998) (explain-
ing that the treaty power is specifically delegated to the federal government, and is independent
of the Commerce Clause and not limited by the Tenth Amendment).
147 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress lacked the authority to enact the Gun-Free
School Zones Act under the Commerce Clause because gun possession is unrelated to economic
or commercial activity under the Commerce Clause).
148 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress exceeded its authority under the Com-
merce Clause to regulate gender-motivated violent crimes since such crimes were unrelated to
economic activity).
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species and not to regulate commercial activity, the Act
seems ripe for a challenge as extending beyond the bounds of
congressional authority. 49
Under Article II, Section 2, the power to make treaties is ex-
pressly delegated to the federal government. Moreover, Article VI,
Section 2 states 'This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land."'15 Article I, Section 8 is the neces-
sary and proper clause and provides Congress with the authority to
pass implementing legislation. In Missouri v. Holland,15 1 the Court
held that the Tenth Amendment prohibitions on federal interference
with state sovereignty do not constrain federal authority to implement
international treaties such as the Ramsar Convention. As Justice
Holmes stated:
To answer this question it is not enough to refer to the
Tenth Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the
United States, because by Article II, § 2, the power to make
treaties is delegated expressly, and by Article VI treaties
made under the authority of the United States, along with the
Constitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance
thereof, are declared the supreme law of the land. If the
treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the
statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessar and proper means
to execute the powers of the Government.
In Missouri, the Court asserted that since Congress has the au-
thority to ratify international treaties, legislation enacted to implement
the treaty is binding on the states. 153 This argument has also been ap-
plied to the Endangered Species Act, 154 and has been or might be ap-
plicable to several other substantive legal areas.155 Notwithstanding
conventional wisdom and the fact that Missouri remains good law, it
is important to note that some commentators question the immunity
149 See Villareal, supra note 146, 1138-1141.
1SO U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
'i 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
152 Id. at432.
"' M at433-35.
154 See Villareal, supra note 146, at 1153-60 (asserting that the Western Convention, a
treaty addressing the international protection of endangered species, provides Congress with
legal authority to enact the Endangered Species Act independent of the Commerce Clause).
155 See Bradley, supra note 146, at 401-09 (suggesting that the treaty power might be used
to overcome federalism constraints such as those the Commerce Clause imposes not only for
environmental statutes, but also for legislation related to religious freedom, human rights, crimi-
nal law and punishment, commerce and trade, and commandeering of state governments).
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of the treaty power from federalism limitations imposed on other fed-
eral powers such as the Commerce Clause.156 For example, Bradley
asserts that the justifications for not subjecting the treaty power to
traditional federalism concerns, are, if not invalid, highly question-
able. Moreover, he argues that Missouri is inconsistent with the re-
newed emphasis on protecting states rights in Lopez and Morrison.
5 7
Finally, the federal government must continue to fund research to
improve our scientific understanding of wetlands functions and the
natural processes that affect them. Through this enhanced under-
standing, the U.S. can improve its ability to successfully employ
compensatory mitigation, particularly through innovate approaches
such as mitigation banks and in-lieu-fee arrangements. 158 In an ex-
panding nation such as the U.S., we must compensate for the adverse
impacts to our wetlands in order to maintain the quality of our envi-
ronment and fulfill our international obligations.
CONCLUSION
U.S. wetlands management demonstrates substantial compliance
with its wise use obligations under the Ramsar Convention. Still,
some significant obstacles remain. The ability of the federal govern-
ment is limited by recent judicial decisions, the need for improved
data and planning, and an improved technical understanding of wet-
land functions. Nevertheless, the U.S. wetlands management provides
a model for other countries, particularly developing countries, to fol-
low, in designing a national wetlands policy and the associated tech-
nical expertise. The Wise Use Guidance has cited both of these items
as critical components.
As the U.S. experience demonstrates, the effort to manage wet-
lands appropriately is financially resource intensive and requires a
substantial number of trained experts. There are potential sources of
funding such as the Global Environment Facility administered by the
United Nations Development Program, which provides grants to help
developing nations protect the environment. Thus, nations that follow
156 See id. at 434-50 (describing the justifications underlying Missouri, or what he terms
the "nationalist view," as the Constitution's specific delegation to the federal government of the
ability to protect state's rights and the need to speak with one-voice with regard to foreign af-
fairs).
157 See id. at 450-51 (arguing that the reasons for protecting federalism are as equally
applicable to the treaty powers as to other powers of the federal government).
158 See Le Demsa, supra note 1, at 517-18 (asserting that we must improve our scientific
and technical ability to build artificial wetlands). See also Silverstein, supra note 50, at 147-61
(discussing several factors that enhance the success rate of mitigation banks including advanced
planning and locating banks within the same watershed as impacted wetlands).
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the U.S. model may need to seek outside funding, especially develop-
ing nations.
A wholesale adoption of U.S. wetlands management policies may
not be appropriate, for example, in a nation that lacks a strong central
government, a tradition of an administrative state, or a system of
property rights similar to that of the U.S. 159 There is strong evidence
that political and administrative frameworks, along with cultural fac-
tors influence the design of health and environmental policies across
developed countries. 16° Plainly, if differences in political, administra-
tive and cultural customs demonstrate that a uniform regulatory ap-
proach cannot be applied across developed countries, a blanket trans-
fer of U.S. wetlands policy to developing nations is unlikely to be
successful.
Finally, the Ramsar Convention should explicitly incorporate
compensatory mitigation, including mitigation banking and in-lieu-
fee arrangements, into the Wise Use Guidance. Though there are
questions about its effectiveness, compensatory mitigation, especially
mitigation banking and in-lieu-fee arrangements, are finding in-
creased use in the U.S. as a means of balancing the needs of economic
growth with those of preserving important wetlands function and val-
ues. While balancing the needs of economic growth and wetlands
preservation is important in the U.S., this may be especially important
in developing nations.
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